

demands of the occupation period. In misleading statements during the last year of the war, War Department and Veterans Administration officials indicated that occupation would be short and painless. The army, perhaps fearful of undermining combat morale, rejected proposals for a more frank explanation of the postvictory task. Not surprisingly, many Americans then were stunned when in August the army, now 8,000,000 strong, released plans to keep millions of men in uniform—over 2,500,000 men through July 1, 1946, a figure soon scaled down to 1,950,000. For a time the cabinet doubted that Congress would support a temporary extension of the draft, a measure needed to man the occupation forces.<sup>7</sup>

The gravest aspect of the August clamor for speedy demobilization was that it seemed to portend a lasting popular hostility toward the military. Impatience to get the boys home was understandable, but the swift reversal in press and congressional attitudes toward basic policies like universal training was alarming. Only months earlier UMT had seemed within grasp. By August, the press and radio reported, congressional backers of UMT were "privately admitting" that they had "lost their fight."<sup>8</sup>

Journalists pointed to army "brasshattedness" to explain the demise of UMT. The army's refusal to speed up demobilization and pare occupation forces indicated to some critics an "unnecessary ramrod-type stubbornness" in the Pentagon. To hold on to their forces the militarists were even whipping up fear of another war, one paper charged. "By necessity in war the military had been in the saddle. They do not want to get off their high horse and walk." The administration's request for an extension of the draft fueled such speculation and undercut the UMT campaign, since critics now suspected that the army, contrary to earlier promises, wanted both selective service and UMT.<sup>9</sup>

Opponents of UMT also scoffed at the military utility of citizens' training. The atomic bomb would "blow up peacetime conscription"

7. SPARTOW, *History of Personnel Demobilization*, pp. 108-11, 141, 238; Millis, *Forrestal Diaries*, p. 90; Stimson Diary, 11 August 1945.

8. Robert St. John, NBC radio network broadcast, 6 August 1945, transcription in War Department Bureau of Public Relations, *Universal Military Training, Including Post-War Military Establishment* . . . , Series 30-55 (hereafter cited as War Department, UMT); see also *New York Times*, 7 August 1945.

9. Quotations from *Danbury New Times*, 14 August 1945; *Shreveport Times*, 9 August 1945; *Raleigh News and Observer*, undated editorial [August 1945], all in War Department, UMT. See also Ward, "Movement for Universal Military Training," pp. 113-14.

and "mean the end of big armies and militarism as bred from big armies," a Colorado senator was quoted as saying. Some columnists urged caution in assessing the effects of the bomb, but many were certain that nuclear weapons rendered land armies obsolete and made strategic air power all important. More broadly, science itself appeared to have replaced the mass conscript army as "the first front" in warfare and the best hope for winning wars "cheaply and easily." "The Postwar army," reported one Washington paper, "will be a compact, extremely mobile force with nightmarishly destructive weapons stemming, like the atom bomb, straight from the laboratories of science." Well-publicized predictions, such as one made by General H. H. Arnold on August 2, hurt the UMT case.

The next sneak attack may not come 2,000 miles from our shores. It may be centralized on Michigan Boulevard, Biscayne Boulevard, Sunset Boulevard or on Main Streets in your home town. We may not have a comfortable cushion of time to plan and build and train. It bodes fair to be sudden death out of a clear sky.

Air power and the atomic bomb did not alone undermine support for UMT. What they did do was deepen public faith in science as an alternative to the traditional sacrifices of war.<sup>10</sup>

Alarmed by popular reaction to the war's end and the advent of nuclear energy, the military grew increasingly pessimistic about the chances that Congress would approve its UMT plans.<sup>11</sup> The services' belief that the coming of peace and the atomic bomb jeopardized UMT was arguable in light of the strong opposition to UMT which already existed before the war's end. But the army and navy were convinced that a peacetime backlash against them had set in.

The services themselves were also still at odds on postwar policy. Throughout the war, long-range planning had been fragmented

10. Quotations from NBC radio network broadcast, 7 August 1945, in War Department, UMT; "Scientific Research Is Our First Defense," *Saturday Evening Post*, 25 August 1945, p. 108; *Washington Times-Herald*, 19 August 1945, and *Pittsburgh Sun-Telegram*, 2 August 1945 (Arnold), both in War Department, UMT. For cautionary comment about the effect of the bomb, see "Are Armies Obsolete?" *New York Herald Tribune*, 11 August 1945; for the opposite view, see Sidney Shallet, "Pattern of Future War is Changed," *New York Times*, 12 August 1945, and Josephine Ripley, "Truman and Atomic Bomb Upset Peacetime Draft," *Christian Science Monitor*, 7 August 1945; all in War Department, UMT.

11. Carpenter to Deputy Director, SPD, 15 August 1945, file 353 (July-Sept 1945), SPD; Persons to Marshall, 1 August 1945, file 353 (157), Chief of Staff; H.A.G. [Colonel Harrison A. Gerhardt] to McCloy, 22 August 1945, file 353 UMT (June 1945), ASW; Arnold, *Global Mission*, pp. 598-99.

\* Hiroshima exposed that. bodes policy -  
in best possible light. (Swampy, virtually...)



For probably the last time in the history of warfare those ocean distances [which aided American defense in World War II] were a vital factor in our defense. We may elect again to depend on others and the whim and error of potential enemies, but if we do we will be carrying the treasure and freedom of this great Nation in a paper bag.

Aggravating the disappearance of geographical defenses was the loss of strong allies to absorb the first blows of a future aggressor. The British navy could no longer shield America. The future enemy, realizing the decisive role played by the United States in the first two world wars, "will not . . . give us time to mobilize our forces and productive capacity; the United States will be attacked first." The JCS did not fully agree on the extent to which geographical isolation had declined—King minimized the danger somewhat. But it seemed clear that "another major war, at worst, would destroy the United States; at best would be won only at a terrible cost in blood and treasure."<sup>19</sup>

With wars too costly to fight, the imperative need was to prevent them. The JCS wanted the United States to have "sufficient military power to make it unwise for any major aggressor nation to initiate a major war against the opposition of the United States." Stimson made the same point more simply. Some people, he complained to the cabinet, discussed UMT "from the point of view of what it will do or not do in regard to the defense of the country in wartime. I prefer," he said, "to look at it from another angle. I do not want war to come. I want to prevent it from ever coming." The United States would prevent future Pearl Harbors, Forrestal told inquiring congressmen, if it were strong enough to "make it obvious that nobody can hope to win a war against us." Overwhelming strength, it was hoped, could pacify the globe.<sup>20</sup>

Should deterrence fail, the more drastic action of preventive war appeared justified. "When it becomes evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by a potential enemy," argued the Joint Chiefs, "we cannot afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive attitude, to permit the first blow to be struck

19. Marshall, *Biennial Report, 1943-1945*, in *War Reports*, p. 290, JPS 633 4, 18 July 1945; King to JCS, 7 September 1945, JCS 1496 1, all in file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 1, JCS.

20. JCS 1496 3, 20 September 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 2, JCS. Statement to the Cabinet on UMT, 7 September 1945, Stimson Diary, 7 September 1945, U. S. Congress, House Committee on Naval Affairs, *Hearings: Senate Report on the Proposed Naval Expansion, 1945-75*, 1945, *Hearings: U. S. Congress, House Committee on the Foreign Relations, 1945-75*, 1945, House Concurrent Resolution 80, p. 1174.

against us." In such a situation, the United States should press for a diplomatic settlement "while making all preparations to strike the first blow if necessary." "We are not going to deliver the first blow," Eisenhower reassured Congress late in the fall; but secret plans suggested otherwise, and even in public testimony some officers hinted strongly at the wisdom of preemptive attacks. The legitimacy of preemptive strikes, only implied in earlier plans, now received the Joint Chiefs' explicit endorsement.<sup>21</sup>

The advocacy of deterrence and preventive war overturned traditional American defense policy. National leaders had always hoped that America's skeletal navy, coastal fortifications, and latent strength would discourage an attack on the homeland. But the nation's feeling of security before World War II arose primarily from its sense of geographical remoteness from the cockpits of conflict, not from confidence in its modest professional military forces. The nation usually built a large war machine only after hostilities began, and then in order to punish aggression or pursue other national goals rather than to deter an attack. Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson did hope that their naval policies would deter war, but even those policies were hemispheric in orientation. Only the aerial rearmament and dispatch of B-17s to the Philippines in 1941 foretold the full sweep of postwar policy, whose intent was to deter not merely attack against the United States but the outbreak of any major conflict. Global deterrence was a policy of the 1940s.<sup>22</sup>

Staff planners were aware of how sharply their recommendations departed from earlier practice. The goal they pursued was "one of active—as contrasted to our traditional policy of passive—defense," they wrote in a July 18 draft of JCS 1496. Successive staff discussion sharpened the emphasis on deterrent and preventive action. Navy planners moved to insert into JCS 1496 an explicit reference to striking "the first blow," and insisted that "this point should be emphasized to make it clear that this is a new concept of policy, different than the American attitude toward war in the past."<sup>23</sup>

Staff planners recognized the risks of deterrence or preemptive

21. JCS 1496 3, 20 September 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 2, JCS. For Eisenhower's testimony, see U. S. Congress, House Committee on Military Affairs, *Hearings, Universal Military Training*, 79/1, 1945, p. 63. For testimony hinting at use of preemptive attacks, see the same *Hearings*, p. 614, testimony of General Ray Porter.

22. On this point, see also Weigley, *American Way of War*, pp. 365-67.

23. Extract from minutes of the Joint Staff Planners' 216th meeting, 29 August 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 1, JCS.



attack: the danger "that if we were to make sudden moves to build up and reinforce outer bases during a time of strained relations we would precipitate the very thing we would want to avoid." In a September 12 meeting, one key officer, General George A. Lincoln, expressed doubt that a first strike would be decisive enough to prevent large-scale retaliation by an enemy. Lincoln acknowledged that "it might be desirable to strike the first blow," but contended that "it is not politically feasible under our system to do so or to state that we will do so." But while the staff acknowledged Lincoln's objections, it did not deem them persuasive enough to retract its recommendations. The nation, one officer argued, "should be prepared to implement a militarily desirable course."<sup>24</sup>

The services' recommendations on deterrence and preventive war constituted a brief for the United States to become the world's policeman and peacemaker. The nature of modern weaponry and the facts of international life gave the United States no other choice, defense experts believed. As Marshall explained:

It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defense as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world. And the peace can only be maintained by the strong.

Rejecting geographical restrictions on American power, the defense chiefs, as Forrestal declared, were determined to use American "power wherever aggression arises in the world." Even as modern weaponry made America more vulnerable to attack, it enabled the United States to project her power further and further outward. As a result, "we will possess the means for retaliatory or punitive attack against other powers who may threaten the United States or the international peace structure in general." The Joint Chiefs were quick to assert that American power would not be used as "an international threat" or instrument of "world domination," but they did not always appreciate that other nations might so regard it.<sup>25</sup>

Defense officials doubted that the United Nations could assist the

24. Extract from minutes of the Joint Staff Planners' 219th meeting, 12 September 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 1, JCS.

25. Marshall, *Biennial Report, 1943-1945*, in *War Reports*, p. 291; House Naval Affairs Committee, *Hearings, Composition of the Postwar Navy*, p. 1175 (Forrestal); JCS 1496/3, 20 September 1945, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 2, JCS. On plans for global peacekeeping, see also Smith, *Air Force Plans*, pp. 46, 48-49, 104-05.

*A main of US opposition to sphere of influence*

United States in policing aggression. Provisions for the veto in the Security Council and the developing tensions with the Soviet Union confirmed the long-held suspicion among military and other planners that the UN would never take military action against a major world power. The UN might evolve into a useful instrument of international peace, the military acknowledged, by performing minor police functions, enforcing nonmilitary sanctions, and marshalling international support for American policies. Furthermore, the military recognized that it must not antagonize domestic opinion or undermine international faith in the UN by permitting "any defeatist or cynical note to creep into ... papers or public discussions about it." Such pessimism about the UN would be self-fulfilling, Assistant Secretary of War McCloy warned, and Marshall and his advisors on the subject, General Lincoln and Colonel Dean Rusk, agreed. However, the armed services believed that the UN would not mobilize substantial police forces, and they no longer used the possibility of a UN police force to justify their force levels for the postwar.<sup>26</sup> *NOT "collective be"*

Dismissing the possibility of collective efforts, the military planned for unilateral enforcement of world peace. But the task would be difficult, the Joint Chiefs knew, because "the maintenance of overwhelmingly strong forces in time of peace is politically and economically unacceptable to the people of the United States." To minimize the burden of national defense, they proposed reliance on small but technologically sophisticated forces capable of rapid movement "to thwart attack by a potential aggressor" or hold off an attack already initiated. Probably to preserve interservice harmony, final plans for JCS 1496 and JCS 1518 downplayed the importance of air power, but the military wanted, as an early draft emphasized, the capacity for "rapid concentration and application of air power, both land- and carrier-based, in a decisive area." As in previous plans, land

26. Quotation from McCloy to Marshall, 23 September 1945, file 336 (192/4) Top Secret, OPD. See also JCS 1496/3, 20 September 1945, pp. 2-3, file CCS 381 (5-13-45) Sec. 2, JCS; Proceedings, meeting of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint War Plans Committee, Joint Staff Planners, and Joint Post War Committee, 3 August 1945, file ABC 381 United Nations (23 January 1942) Sec. 3-d, OPD; unsigned memorandum [probably OPD staff] to Lincoln, 3 August 1945, file ABC 092 (18 July 1945) Sec. 1-a, OPD; Report by the Joint Staff Planners, "U.S. Quota of Armed Forces for the United Nations," 13 September 1945, and Lincoln to Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff, 30 September 1945, both in file ABC 040 (2 November 1943) Sec. 5-a, OPD; Marshall to McCloy, 2 October 1945, file 336 (192/4) Top Secret, OPD. War Department spokesmen did hint that UMT trainees might serve in an international force; see House Military Affairs Committee, *Hearings, UMT*, p. 47.



of this disciple of Theodore Roosevelt. In his final hours as secretary of war, Stimson had not turned soft. He had not abandoned his fears of the Soviet Union nor his faith in military strength; he had balanced his plea for nuclear sanity with an impassioned call for UMT. But he sought to liquidate a policy of nuclear coercion whose risks were many and rewards were few. Backed for the moment by some scientists, his civilian assistants, and his successor, Robert Patterson, Stimson argued before the cabinet and the President that the United States must approach Moscow in an attitude of trust on the nuclear matter, lest relations between the two nations become "irretrievably embittered."<sup>46</sup>

Where Stimson tried to lead, few followed. Though cautious, his proposals found little favor in the armed services. Believing themselves "on a road where we can neither stop nor turn back," military leaders stumbled forward on their course. Although recognizing that a contest for atomic weapons could only erode American security and that negotiations for international control of atomic energy were desirable, they could envision no real alternative to an arms race. Forrester regarded sharing nuclear information as equivalent to the appeasement tried with Hitler. The Joint Chiefs recommended secrecy on nuclear energy until the major powers settled all their fundamental differences. In October, a JCS committee proposed an accelerated effort at research and production of atomic weapons, the maintenance of maximum secrecy, and the "refusal to give these secrets to any other nation or the United Nations Organization." To hasten progress down the chosen path, the War Department led an effort to insure military control over future atomic research and development. Aided by the chieftains of science, Bush and Conant, the services would win a substantial victory in the final legislation for the Atomic Energy Commission, though the new agency would force them to forgo some of the ironclad authority over nuclear matters they had enjoyed in wartime.<sup>47</sup>

Certain that it could choose no other course, the military now made

46. Alperovitz, *Atomic Diplomacy*, pp. 276-79, reprints the documents containing Stimson's recommendations. See also Truman, *Memoirs*, 1:524-25; Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, pp. 417-20, 424-25; Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, p. 248; unpublished Forrester diaries, pp. 493-98, Naval History Division.

47. Quotations from JCS 1477/1, pp. 3-4. See also Leahy to President, 23 October 1945, Leahy File 125, JCS; Robert G. Albion and Robert H. Connery, *Forrester and the Navy*, pp. 181-82; Millis, *Forrester Diaries*, pp. 94-96; Truman, *Memoirs*, 1:526-28; Hewlett and Anderson, *The New World*, p. 420; John Morton Blum, *I Was For Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War II*, pp. 320-22.

\* Sen. Harris, at Passchendale

plans to use the bomb as its primary instrument of massive deterrence and retaliation. That policy was no secret. In his November 1945 published report to the secretary of war, Arnold asserted that the nation must make it "apparent to a potential aggressor that an attack on the United States would be immediately followed by an immensely devastating air-atomic attack on him." Going beyond Arnold, a secret JCS staff study weighed the advisability of both retaliatory and preventive atomic strikes against the Soviet Union. The Joint Intelligence Committee suggested twenty Soviet cities suitable for atomic bombing in case "the U.S.S.R. has either initiated aggression [in Europe or Asia] or has clearly indicated that aggression against the United States is imminent." The committee recommended an atomic attack not only in case of an imminent Soviet attack but in the contingency that enemy industrial and scientific progress suggested a capability for an "eventual attack against the United States or defense against our attack." The committee advised "that use of strategic air power should be given highest priority" in any effort to arrest Russian progress toward an attack capability. The committee added that atomic bombing was relatively ineffective against conventional military forces and transportation systems—an admission that the bomb really would be useful only for mass destruction of urban targets.<sup>48</sup>

The doctrines of massive deterrence and retaliation, as the new policies would later be called, had begun to receive the emphasis that would be given them throughout the cold war. Their adoption indicated the bankruptcy of strategic planning. The military committed itself to an arms race which it recognized could in the long run only weaken national security. It advocated a deterrent whose credibility it had cause to doubt. It could find no practical use for the new weapon—no way to utilize the bomb in a manner limited in destructiveness but decisive in warfare. It could only propose enlarging the destruction so lavishly practiced in the war just fought.

### The New Enemy

The formulation of a contingency plan for an atomic attack against the Soviet Union indicated that military suspicions of the Red ally

48. Arnold, *Third Report*, in *War Reports*, p. 464; Joint Intelligence Committee Paper 329, "Strategic Vulnerability of the U.S.S.R. to a Limited Air Attack," (November 1945, file ABC 336 Russia (22 August 1945), OPD.

\* Henden, 199, 373n: Oct 25, 1945



doubts about the ability of a military command to anticipate a surprise attack in time to throw its forces into battle before they were destroyed. The new chief of staff himself acknowledged as much. "You cannot be ready on M-day," Eisenhower told a House committee. "For one thing, you cannot be ready psychologically on M-day. It takes a Pearl Harbor to inspire us to face the necessity of fighting, and we cannot be ready on that day."<sup>80</sup> If the enemy struck too swiftly, if constant readiness were impossible, if adequate warning were unlikely, then an American counterstrike by air might never materialize or might prove too weak to decide the conflict. There could ensue a protracted struggle in which the decisive factor might be not M-day readiness but the nation's capacity rapidly to mobilize its total resources, including its navy and ground army. The nation which relied too heavily on a powerful M-day force would then confront the dilemma faced by the United States in 1941: whether to throw its small professional army immediately into battle or to use it as a training cadre for building up a force adequate to defeat the enemy. Such a dilemma would be even more excruciating if, as all predicted, the course of war were swifter in the future. By failing sufficiently to explore the possibility of an indecisive M-day battle, UMT defenders neglected perhaps the most convincing argument for citizens' training. Of course air power experts were disinclined to entertain objections that cast doubt on their theories.

Postwar planners also ignored the mixed results of the strategic air offensives of World War II. "The Strategic Theory," Arnold wrote at the end of the war, "postulates that air attack on internal enemy vitals can so deplete specific industrial and economic resources, and on occasion the will to resist as to make continued resistance by the enemy impossible." Arnold continued:

Examination of *any* national economy will disclose several specific industries or other national activities without which the nation cannot effectively carry on modern warfare. It is conceivable that there will always be one so necessary to all phases of the national war-making ability that its destruction would be fatal to the nation.<sup>81</sup>

80. House Military Affairs Committee, *Hearings, UMT*, p. 76. The classic study is Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*.

81. Arnold, *Third Report, in War Reports*, p. 457 (italics added). Arnold's thinking had been changed little by the war. He had written in 1942: "The schooled air strategist will study the enemy nation to determine his solar plexus, his vital nerve centers. He will then locate these and determine what is required for their destruction." From Henry H. Arnold and Ira G. Eaker, *Army Flyer* (New York, 1942), p. 264.

The existence and vulnerability of such an industry was questionable even in highly advanced industrial states, much less in more rudimentary economies. Indeed, planners had already commented on the relative imperviousness of the Soviet economy to strategic attack. Furthermore, the AAF's frustrating experience in bombing Germany and its switch to night area bombing of Japan might have been taken as its own tacit confession of the inadequacies of precision bombing. But the AAF clung stubbornly to a simplistic theory of air power developed in the 1920s and 1930s.

A dispassionate reading of the studies of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey would have dispelled some of the excessive confidence in the bomber. By the fall of 1945, the survey, established at the AAF's initiative, was completing its reports on Germany and beginning those on Japan. The reports emphasized the difficulties involved in ascertaining and attacking "bottleneck" targets in an enemy economy. The survey staff found that "even in the case of a very concentrated industry very heavy and continuous attack must be made," and that civilian morale stabilized after initial urban attacks. Attacks on urban and industrial targets in Germany proved less useful than those on Nazi transportation, the survey showed. German war production peaked in 1944 despite relentless bombing, but much material never reached the front. Taken together, the survey reports suggested air power was relatively ineffective unless used to incinerate enemy cities on an indiscriminate scale, as in Japan, or employed in concert with ground and naval forces, or delivered with a precision attainable only after months of effort and the destruction of enemy fighter forces. As Walter Millis later wrote, the decisive factor in World War II was not independent air power but rather "the mechanization of the ground battlefield with automotive transport, with the 'tactical' airplane and above all with the tank." The war punctured the dream of air power as capable of swift, decisive attack on the enemy's jugular.<sup>82</sup>

Understandably the AAF, bent on justifying an independent strategic mission, did not appreciate the significance for future strategy

82. Quotations from United States Strategic Bombing Survey, *Over-all Report (European War)*, p. 29; Millis, *Arms and Men*, p. 253. For the formation of the survey, the AAF's attitude toward it, the dates of reports, and some of the survey's findings, see David MacIsaac, "The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, 1944-1947" (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1970). For further discussion of the weaknesses in the AAF's arguments for strategic air power, see Millis, *Arms and Men*, pp. 252-60; Smith, *Air Force Plans*, chaps. 2-3; Legere, "Unification of the Armed Forces," pp. 408-22, an older but still useful study.



of the survey's findings. More surprisingly, neither did the Army General Staff, which might presumably have welcomed ammunition for use against the AAF's claims. Perhaps all parties felt that the atomic bomb settled the air power question once and for all, though the JCS staff doubted that was the case. Whatever the reason, the AAF's only concession to the war experience was to propose a large force of long-range fighters which could protect its bomber force. Ever since the devastating losses of American bombers over Germany in 1943, the vision of a bomber so bristling with armaments that it could sweep past enemy defenses had faded. That concession represented little doctrinal change, however. The close support of ground and amphibious troops, the interdiction of enemy supplies and reinforcements, and defense against enemy aviation received little attention from the AAF high command.<sup>83</sup>

Finally, the military might have questioned, as it had begun to do with the atomic bomb, whether the very destructiveness of strategic bombing might preclude its future use. If incineration were the only feasible objective of strategic air power, then how readily could the United States unleash the bomber? The military was too confident of deterrence to address that question. The AAF saw its planes as forming the core of a global police force which would deter or preempt an attack rather than fight it off. If American power could prevent war, there was no urgency in discussing how to wage it.

## EPILOGUE: THE LEGACY

World War II marked a revolution in the power of the American armed forces. Before the war the United States had been a modest power; though endowed with the potential of a giant, it had remained wedded to a hemispheric and defensive strategy and had confined the military to a minor role in politics. After the war the United States possessed the power to destroy entire nations, positioned its forces throughout the globe, used them repeatedly to impose the nation's will, and allowed them a commanding position in the American government and economy.

At one, superficial level, wartime military officials responsible for postwar plans played only a small role in the transformation of American military power. Bureaucratic tangles and mutual jealousies often obstructed their efforts. Divided among themselves, the services also took little initiative to coordinate their programs with other governmental agencies or to confirm them with higher authority. Eager to advance service interests, they screened out those strategic considerations which failed to justify their hopes, a practice so transparent that it only sabotaged the military's ability to defend its programs before Congress and the president.

By their own standards, army and navy planners had failed by 1945. Service leaders had built their political strategy, like their military program, on the supposed lessons of their prewar experience. Suspicious of the layman's wisdom and of his willingness to support national defense in peacetime, both the military and scientific elites tried either to bypass Congress or at least to secure congressional approval of their plans before the end of the war dissipated the martial spirit. The strategy of early approval did not work. Political differences within the military, the weakness of the planning staffs, and objections to military programs from Congress and the White House, especially the Budget Bureau, all hampered the military's efforts. Preoccupation with fighting the war, and then the war's abrupt termination, also upset military timetables. On V-J day, Con-

83. Smith, *Air Force Plans*, pp. 24-25, 35-37, 58.